The paper analyzes a two-stage oligopoly game of semi-collusion in production described by a system with a symmetric structure. We examine the local stability of a Nash equilibrium and the presence of bifurcations. We discover that the model is capable of exhibiting extremely complicated dynamic behaviors.
Complex Dynamics of a Model with R&D Competition
Ferrara, Massimiliano
Membro del Collaboration Group
;Ciano, TizianaMethodology
;
2021-01-01
Abstract
The paper analyzes a two-stage oligopoly game of semi-collusion in production described by a system with a symmetric structure. We examine the local stability of a Nash equilibrium and the presence of bifurcations. We discover that the model is capable of exhibiting extremely complicated dynamic behaviors.File in questo prodotto:
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