We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.
Institutional Design, Political Competition and Spillovers
Alderighi M;Feder C
2020-01-01
Abstract
We establish a link between the best system of government and the strength of inter-state spillovers within a model of political competition with self-interested parties. We show the superiority of the unitary system when: inter-state spillovers are strong; the ego rents of local parties are high; and the system of government is chosen under a veil of ignorance.File in questo prodotto:
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